quinta-feira, 26 de agosto de 2010

Akerlof's paper uses the market for used cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. A used car is one in which ownership is transferred from one person to another, after a period of use by its first owner and its inevitable wear and tear. There are good used cars ("cherries") and defective used cars ("lemons"), normally as a consequence of several non-always-traceable variables such as the owner's driving style, quality and frequency of maintenance and accident history. Due to the fact that many important mechanical parts and other innards are hidden from view and not easily accessible for inspection, the buyer of a car does not know beforehand whether it is a cherry or a lemon. So the buyer's best guess for a given car is that the car is of average quality; accordingly, he/she will be willing to pay for it only the price of a car of known average quality. This means that the owner of a carefully-maintained, never-abused, good used car will be unable to get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile.

Therefore, owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. The withdrawal of good cars reduces the average quality of cars on the market, causing buyers to revise downward their expectations for any given car. This, in turn, motivates the owners of moderately good cars not to sell, and so on. The result is that a market in which there is asymmetrical information with respect to quality shows characteristics similar to those described by Gresham's Law: the bad drives out the good (although Gresham's Law applies to a different situation).

"Lemon market" effects have also been noted in other markets, such as used computers[citation needed] . There are also parallels in the insurance market, where, unless those least likely to need insurance (i.e., those least likely to get in accidents) are forced to buy insurance, it is those most likely to need insurance compensation who tend most to buy insurance, eliminating the advantage of diffusing risk that insurance is supposed to provide (adverse selection).
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da wikidedia

1 comentário:

segismundo brota-só-qualquer-coisa-porque-sim disse...

O fenómeno que não aparece é o da chinoiserie, como me apetece aqui chamá-lo descontextualizando o termo.

passo a explicar.

ora os chineses sempre foram uns catitas e mandavam para cá os biombos fantásticos mas cuja produção era específica para o exterior do império (se bem me recordo das aulas). e nos mesmos barcos, logo promovidos a navios porque a coisa rendia, vinham os mings e outras belas porcelanas de vários feitios com belas amostras de cães fantásticamente amestrados. tanto que muitos anos depois ainda por cá andam e na mesma posição e isto por ninguém se haver lembrado de atirar uma moedinha.

a coisa pegou de tal forma, que dado o valor do novo, multiplicaram-se sucedâneos de fraca qualidade vendidos a rodos e que impossibilitam sequer a revenda. muito bom será se durarem uns poucos de meses. porquê? por causa dessa coisa dos limões. antes novo e mau que velho e bom.

ora, o resultado mais directo, é que antes um bmw velho e com um problema no motor, que sempre se compõe e dura e dura, que um txing tong pué que nem novo vale o que se paga por ele.

eventualmente, o fenómeno inverte-se. veremos. embora duvide do meu próprio raciocínio.